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We examine the relation between the presence of golden parachutes and the cost of debt 
financing.  We hypothesize that since golden parachutes compensate CEOs in the event 
of termination, CEOs with golden parachutes will have an incentive to increase firm risk 
and decrease effort, and this will lead to a higher cost of debt. Consistent with these 
hypotheses, we document a significant positive relation between the use of golden 
parachutes and the cost of debt. We confirm these results with a natural experiment 
using a difference-in-difference specification based on a 2004 change in IRS tax 
regulations.  Moreover, we find that the adoption of a golden parachute is associated 
with an increase in firm risk, a higher likelihood of CEO turnover, and a lower operating 
performance.    Overall, the evidence suggests that golden parachutes are primarily 
negative for the firm and for debt holders in particular. 
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I.  Introduction 
Senior executive compensation packages adopted by boards of directors often contain large 
payouts, or severance agreements, called golden parachutes that provide cash and non-cash 
compensation if certain events such as demotion, termination, or forced resignation occur (see, 
e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang, 2010).1 Golden parachutes have become increasingly popular 
in the last two decades with the RiskMetrics data set documenting an increase in adoptions 
from roughly 50% in 1990 to 82% in 2010. Until recently, the adoption of golden parachutes did 
not require shareholder approval, although under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, firms are now 
required to receive approval from their shareholders when adding a golden parachute to the 
executive’s compensation contract. In this paper, we examine the effect of golden parachutes on 
CEO incentives with respect to risk and effort, and show how the presence of golden parachutes 
in compensation contracts affects the firm’s cost of debt capital. We hypothesize that since 
golden parachutes provide a large payment in the event of termination, CEOs have an incentive 
to increase firm risk and decrease effort. We posit that this increase in risk and decrease in effort 
leads to an increase in the firm’s cost of debt.  
In contrast to our focus on CEO incentives and the cost of debt, the existing literature on 
golden parachutes mostly considers their effects on takeovers and stock prices.  For instance, 
Machlin, Choe, and Miles (1993), and Lambert and Larcker (1995) show that golden parachutes 
imply a greater takeover probability, while Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) show that 
greater payouts to the CEO are associated with lower acquisition premia.  An early event study 
by Lambert and Larcker (1985) finds a positive shareholder response to the adoption of golden 
parachutes; but more recent research  by  Brusa, Lee, and Shook (2009)  finds that golden 
parachute adoption is a negative event, and more negative for more generous golden 
parachutes.  Recently, Bechuck, Cohen, and Wang (2010) document that golden parachutes are 
associated with a decrease in firm value, a greater likelihood  of acquisition, and a lower 
acquisition premium. Overall, the literature finds mixed evidence on the relation between 
golden parachutes and shareholder wealth.  
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this research, the term golden parachute refers to severance payments to departing CEOs 
regardless of whether or not there is a change in control. While the existing literature describes golden parachutes as 
applying only when a change in control occurs, upon examining a sample of 50 recent proxy filings we find that most 
of these payouts apply regardless of whether there is a change in control.  3 
 
We focus on the debt market for several reasons. First, although the debt market is one of 
the largest markets in the world and it is dominated by sophisticated institutional investors, 
existing research has largely ignored how individual governance mechanisms such as golden 
parachutes affect the pricing of public corporate debt. Second, since  bonds have shorter 
durations than equity, their valuations are well specified and less subject to the criticism that 
the results might be driven by misspecification of the equilibrium asset pricing model when 
compared to equity valuations. Third, bonds are less subject to endogeneity as causality is 
unlikely to be an issue.  That is, a change in whether the firm has a golden parachute can cause 
yields to change, but it is unlikely that changes in yield spreads will cause firms to adopt or 
remove golden parachutes from their compensation contracts (our econometric tests also find 
no evidence of endogeneity in the yield spread specifications).   
We hypothesize that CEOs with golden parachutes have an incentive to increase firm risk 
and decrease effort and  this would lead to a higher cost of debt capital. We  examine this 
hypothesis using panel data from a large sample of publicly traded firms covering the period 
from 1990 to 2006. We find a significant and positive association between the use of golden 
parachutes and bond yield spreads. Specifically, we find that firms in which the CEO has a 
golden parachute have yield spreads that  are  about  12% higher than similar firms without 
golden parachutes. This result is robust to controlling for credit rating, the likelihood of a 
takeover attempt, institutional ownership, state laws, golden parachute adoption (new vs. old), 
and firm-specific fixed effects.2 
To establish that the presence of golden parachutes causes a higher cost of debt, we conduct 
a natural experiment using the IRS tax ruling adopted in January, 1 2004. This ruling contains 
two parts: Section 280G prohibits corporations from deducting golden parachute payments, and 
Section 4999 imposes an additional 20% excise tax on the excess parachute payment for the 
executive.3 Because CEOs of firms which still receive an excessive payout are subject to an 
excise tax, this implies smaller incentives for the CEO from the golden parachute.4  This IRS 
                                                 
2 Takeovers often, but not always, have a negative impact for debt holders (see, e.g., Asquith and Wizman, 1990; 
and Billet, King, and Mauer, 2004). 
3 Excess parachute payments are defined as payments at least three times the executive base salary made to a an 
employee or independent contractor who is either an officer, shareholder, or highly compensated individual at any 
time in that year, contingent upon the occurrence of a change of control for the firm.  
4 Examining several severance packages, we find that firms decrease the packages they offer the CEO around the 
IRS ruling change date to avoid the excess parachute payment.    4 
 
ruling is exogenous as firms did not lobby congress for it and had no incentive to do so.   
Therefore, the adoption of this ruling is a natural experiment that we can use to study the effect 
of exogenous changes in golden parachutes on changes in the cost of debt.   We compare 
changes in the cost of debt for golden parachute and  non-golden parachute firms using a 
difference-in-difference specification.  We  find that the difference  in  bond yield spreads 
between golden parachute and non-golden parachute firms is smaller after the adoption of the 
IRS rules. Thus, the effect of golden parachutes on bond spreads is  diminished when the 
economic value of the parachute to the CEO decreases. This evidence suggests that changes in 
the adoption of golden parachutes cause  changes  in  yield spreads, confirming our main 
regression results. 
We next examine the relation between the use of golden parachutes and firm risk, operating 
performance, and CEO turnover. Lys, Rusticus, and Sletten (2007) argue that, when managers 
are risk averse, the use of large severance agreements provides managers with downside 
protection in addition to rewards for exceptional stock performance. This downside protection 
induces managers to undertake risky projects which in turn will increase the cost of capital. 
Alternatively,  Yermack (2006)  provides evidence that  firms are motivated to adopt golden 
“handshakes” to mitigate managerial problems including inadequate risk-taking, shirking, 
entrenchment in office, and incomplete disclosure. Similarly,  Rau and Xu (2010) find that 
contingent severance pay is promised in advance for managers to provide insurance for their 
human capital value and compensate them for the risks they undertake.  
The literature also provides evidence about how the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
governance index of shareholder rights is associated with decreased CEO effort.  Core, Guay, 
and Rusticus (2006) examine the association between corporate governance, as proxied by the 
Gompers et al. (2003) index of shareholder rights, and operating performance.  Core et al. find a 
significant negative association between governance and return on assets, which suggests that 
badly governed firms have greater agency costs. Bertrand and Mullainaithan (2003) also find 
that managers who are more insulated from the takeover market are less likely to take risks and 
more likely to “enjoy the quiet life.” We hypothesize that CEOs with golden parachutes also 
have higher turnover.  This greater turnover would reflect the increased risk and decreased 
effort associated with golden parachutes, and the fact that CEOs with golden parachutes are 
more willing to be dismissed from their positions.  5 
 
 
Empirically, we test whether golden parachutes have an effect on CEO incentives. Using a 
sample of publicly traded debt, we find that firms which adopt golden parachutes exhibit 
increases in firm volatility (both  idiosyncratic  risk  as well as total risk). Firms with golden 
parachutes also have weaker industry-adjusted returns on assets. Moreover, firms with golden 
parachutes are more likely to have the CEO leave the firm, and again this holds even if we 
exclude firms which faced a takeover attempt. Overall, these findings are consistent with an 
increase in risk and a decrease in effort for CEOs with golden parachutes. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on the effect of golden parachutes on security prices.  
We provide evidence that the use of golden parachutes implies a higher cost of debt.  Moreover, 
we show that the increase in the cost of debt associated with golden parachutes coincides with 
an increase in firm risk, a decrease in profitability, and an increase in CEO turnover.  The 
evidence that golden parachutes are not beneficial to bondholders contrasts with  the prior 
findings that a higher value to the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index is 
associated with a decrease in the cost of debt (see, e.g., Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005, and 
Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007).  However, the incentive effects of golden parachutes differ from 
the incentive effects of other governance index components. Our finding that golden parachutes 
increase the cost of borrowing complements the results of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2010) 
who find that firms adopting a golden parachute have a lower industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, and 
that their value declines during the period of adoption and continues to erode subsequently.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops our hypotheses and 
provides background literature. Section 3 discusses the data and variable measurement.  Section 
4 provides our results on the relation between golden parachutes and the cost of debt and 
augments our evidence using a natural experiment. Section 5 presents our results on how 
golden parachutes affect CEO incentives with respect to risk and effort.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Golden parachutes, the Cost of Debt, and Firm Behavior 
2.1. Golden Parachutes and CEO Incentives 6 
 
We begin by providing an intuitive discussion of the implications of golden parachutes for 
CEO behavior. More formal models of effort, risk-taking, and incentives exist (see, e.g., 
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Prendergast, 2002). A few papers also theoretically address how 
golden parachutes are related to management compensation and effort (see, e.g., Lambert and 
Larcker, 1985; Knoeber, 1986). However, we believe that the implications here are sufficiently 
straight-forward that a formal model is not necessary.   
In a standard principal-agent model, the agent is risk-averse whereas the principal is not.  
Because golden parachutes provide large payouts in cases of termination, demotion, or 
resignation, this implies a new set of incentives for the CEO.  Specifically, CEOs with golden 
parachutes have an incentive to increase risk relative to those who do not have these provisions 
in their contracts (and see also Lys, Rusticus, and Sletten, 2007, and Muscarella and Zhao, 2012).  
If the additional risk pays off, the CEO will be compensated for good performance. If the 
additional risk does not pay off, the firm is more likely to fire the CEO. With a golden 
parachute, this downside has fewer negative consequences for the CEO. Thus, all else equal, we 
hypothesize that the adoption of a golden parachute implies greater firm risk, and this relation 
holds even when considering those firms that did not receive a takeover bid.5   
Similarly, a CEO with a golden parachute may have an incentive to reduce his/her effort.  
If this lower effort implies that their employment is more likely to be terminated, the CEO 
would still be able to receive a golden parachute. Again, since golden parachutes provide large 
payouts to the CEO, we hypothesize that golden parachutes are associated with the CEO 
leaving more often. Moreover, we hypothesize that this relation holds even when the firm does 
not receive a takeover bid. 
 
2.2. Golden Parachutes and Bondholder Wealth 
The existing literature on the relation between golden parachutes and equity values 
provides mixed results.  Lambert and Larcker (1985) find a positive shareholder response to the 
adoption of golden parachutes, while Brusa, Lee, and Shook (2009) and Bechuck, Cohen, and 
                                                 
5 Yermack (2006) discusses the incentive effects of separation packages (or golden handshakes). He argues that 
these contracts may be optimal because they serve as an instrument of damage control when CEOs are ousted, 
helping the board to protect corporate secrets and heading off litigation or adverse publicity. In our sample of golden 
parachutes, which includes a sub-sample of golden handshakes, we find no evidence of positive effects of these 
contracts. 7 
 
Wang (2010) find that golden parachutes are negatively associated with equity value.  We 
instead focus on the effect of golden parachutes on bondholder wealth. Given our hypotheses 
above, we discuss the effects of golden parachutes on the cost of debt financing through 
takeovers, risk taking, and effort. 
Takeovers can decrease the value of the target firm’s debt (see Asquith and Wizman, 1990), 
and this effect can be larger for high-grade bonds (Billet, King, and Mauer, 2004).  An increase 
in the probability of a takeover could therefore increase the firm’s cost of debt.  Moreover, 
Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) show that golden parachutes are associated with a larger 
payout to the CEO and a smaller payout to shareholders. Thus, takeovers associated with 
golden parachutes may be less advantageous for the firm’s other stakeholders.  An increase in 
risk taking would also be associated with a decrease in debt value (Campbell and Taksler, 2003). 
Further, CEO turnover is associated with an increase in equity volatility (Clayton, Hartzell, and 
Rosenberg, 2005), and an increase in the cost of debt capital (Adams and Mansi, 2009).  Lastly, if 
the CEO puts in less effort, this may decrease firm value, and this could also imply an increase 
in the cost of debt.  Thus, the theoretical implications of golden parachutes for bond values are 
overwhelmingly negative. We therefore hypothesize a positive relation between the use of 
golden parachutes and bond yield spreads. 
In contrast, other components of the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index 
decrease the ease of hostile takeovers, and therefore they insulate management from the market 
for corporate control.  Managers with more antitakeover protection may therefore decrease risk 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003), and this leads to a lower cost of debt (Klock, Mansi, and 
Maxwell, 2005; Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007). We argue that the incentive effects of golden 
parachutes differ from the incentive effects of other governance index components.6   
 
3. Data and Variable Measurement 
3.1. Data Sources 
                                                 
6 An important related question is, given the negative incentive effects, why are golden parachutes included in 
CEO compensation contracts? We do not address this question in this analysis, as we instead focus on the 
implications of golden parachutes for CEO behavior and debt value.  However, one possibility is that golden 
parachutes are a case of faulty contract design that has spread through the marketplace for CEOs (see, e.g., Hillion 
and Vermaelen, 2004). 8 
 
We utilize seven databases in our analysis of the impact of golden parachutes on the cost of 
debt financing. These include: (i) Lehman Brothers (LBFI) Fixed Income databases for bond 
characteristics and pricing information, (ii) RiskMetrics corporate governance database for 
antitakeover provisions including golden parachutes and severance agreements, (iii) Compustat 
Industrial Annual database for financial information, (iv) executive compensation (Execucomp) 
database for information on top executives characteristics and compensation, (v) CRSP database 
for stock prices and returns information, (vi) Thomson Financial Institutional Ownership (13F) 
database for institutional ownership  information, and (vii) SDC database for mergers and 
acquisitions information. 
RiskMetrics reports data on antitakeover provisions every two to three years (in the years 
1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006).  To construct a continuous dataset, we follow 
the standard in the literature and fill the missing years by assuming that the provisions in any 
given year were in place in the years preceding the publication date. We also exclude financial 
firms with SIC codes from 6000 to 6999 due to the non-comparable financial structures in these 
industries. The final dataset consists of 22,931 firm-year observations on 2,730 firms covering 
the years from 1990 to 2006.7  For a firm-year observation to be included in our analysis, the 
firm must be present in the RiskMetrics database and must have a debt issue available in the 
LBFI database. Financial information must also be available in the Compustat database and 
stock pricing information in CRSP.   Additional information on institutional and insider 
ownership is collected from the Execucomp and Thomson Financial databases for a subsample.  
Merging the databases and applying these requirements yields a data set of 4,614 firm-year 
observations for 780 firms for the years from 1990 to 2006.8 
 
                                                 
7 Note that the sample cutoff year of 2006 is not arbitrary. In late 2006, the original provider for golden parachute 
data,  the  Institutional Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), was acquired by RiskMetrics.  Upon manual 
examination of SEC filings, it appears that RiskMetrics changed the methodology for collecting golden parachutes for 
the years 2007 and 2008 to include only severance packages in excess of those three times the annual salary for the 
CEO, which is not in line with the prior IRRC methodology.  The U.S. tax code implies different consequences if the 
severance package is three times or more the annual salary, and many golden parachutes are set to just below this 
threshold. RiskMetrics reversed its methodology in 2009 to put in all golden parachutes. We therefore also examine 
the results using the data in 2009 and filling in for the years 2007 and 2008 and find similar results. 
8 To minimize survivorship bias, we allow firms to exit and reenter the data set.  9 
 
3.2. Measuring the Cost of Debt 
We use the LBFI database to measure a firm’s cost of debt. The final dataset contains month-
end security specific information such as bid price, coupon, yield, credit ratings from Moody’s 
and S&P, duration, issue, and maturity dates on nonconvertible bonds that are used in the 
Lehman Brothers bond indexes.  Securities are included based on firm size, liquidity, credit 
ratings, maturity, and trading frequency.  We limit our analysis to only the fiscal year-end 
prices and yields so as to coincide with firm accounting data.   
The dependent variable, the log of the yield spread or bond risk premium, is used to 
measure the cost of debt financing.  The yield spread is defined as the difference between the 
yield to maturity on a corporate bond and the yield to maturity on its duration equivalent 
Treasury security.  For firms with multiple observations in the sample, a weighted average yield 
spread is computed, with the weight being the amount outstanding for each security divided by 
the total amount outstanding for all available publicly traded debt.  In the cases where no 
corresponding Treasury yield is available for a given maturity, the yield spread is calculated 
using interpolation based on the Svensson (1994) model (or the modified Nelson and Siegel, 
1987, exponential functional form). 
 
3.3. Measuring Golden Parachute and Firm Risk 
We measure golden parachutes using a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a 
golden parachute in the compensation contract for its CEO.  RiskMetrics currently defines a 
golden parachute as a severance contract payable in the event of a change in control or any 
severance payment greater than three times salary plus bonus. We also utilize two additional 
variables to capture the firm’s use of golden parachutes: (i) a dummy variable that equals one if 
a golden parachutes is adopted in the current year but is not in place in the previous year based 
on the filled dataset (Add Golden Parachute), and (ii) a dummy variable that equals one if a 
golden parachute is adopted in the current year that existed in the previous year based on the 
filled dataset (Keep Golden Parachute).9 
                                                 
9 We also examine the results using a dummy variable that equals one if a golden parachute is adopted in a 
previous year but is not in place in the current year (i.e., if it was removed) and find insignificant results. 10 
 
We include the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index (GIndex) based on 24 
antitakeover provisions from the  RiskMetrics dataset for the years 1990 to 2006.    We  also 
include a subset of the GIndex based on the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment 
index  of  six antitakeover provisions  (classified boards,  golden parachutes, limits to amend 
charter, limits to amend bylaws, supermajority, and poison pill) for the entire dataset covering 
the years 1990 to 2006.  Bebchuk et al. (2009) find that the six variables in the entrenchment 
index are sufficient to capture the impact of all the antitakeover provisions on stock value.  As 
golden parachutes are considered separately, we exclude them from these indices. 
For the firm risk analysis, we use both total risk and idiosyncratic risk. We measure total 
risk as the natural logarithm of the annualized variance of daily returns. For idiosyncratic risk, 
we follow Low (2009) and compute idiosyncratic risk as the natural logarithm of the annualized 
variance of the residuals from the market model. Specifically, we obtain daily stock prices from 
CRSP to calculate daily stock returns for each firm in the sample over the period 1990 to 2006.  
The firm’s daily stock return is the dependent variable in the market model.  We use the CRSP 
value weighted market portfolio as our  measure of market returns, and we adjust for non-
synchronous trading by adding five leads and five lags of this portfolio (Dimson, 1979).   
For the performance analysis, we follow Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) and use three 
measures:  operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets  (ROA1), operating 
income after depreciation scaled by total assets (ROA2), and firm annual sales growth (Sales 
Growth). All three measures are computed net of the industry median using the Fama and 
French (1997) industry classifications.   
 
3.4. Control Variables   
The remaining variables are firm and security specific controls.   Firm-specific controls 
include firm size, leverage, profitability, market-to-book, sales growth, and volatility. Firm size 
(Size), a proxy for economics of scale and a takeover deterrent, is measured as the natural log of 
total assets. Firm leverage (Leverage), a proxy for financial health, is measured as the ratio of 
total debt to total assets.  Firm profitability (Profitability), a proxy for financial performance, is 
measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by 
total assets.  Sales growth (SGrowth) is the firm’s annual growth in revenue.  Market-to-book 11 
 
ratio, a proxy for growth opportunities, is computed as the market value of assets (measured as 
the number of shares outstanding times share price plus the book value of debt) scaled by the 
book value of assets. Firm volatility (Volatility) is the annualized standard deviation of the 
residuals from the market model  of daily returns.  Given a small number of extreme 
observations and to ensure that outliers are not driving any of our results, we winsorize the 
variables size, leverage, market to book, and profitability at the 1% level.  
Security specific variables include credit ratings, duration, convexity, and liquidity.  Firm 
credit rating (Rating) is the average of Moody’s and S&P bond ratings and represents the 
average firm credit rating at the date of the yield observation.10  Bond ratings are computed 
using a conversion process in which AAA rated bonds are assigned a value of 22 and D rated 
bonds receive a value of 1.11  One methodology used in the literature allows for the fact that the 
credit rating variable may incorporate part or all of the information from governance factors.  
As such, we estimate the impact of credit rating excluding the effect of golden parachutes.  That 
is, we regress the rating variable on the golden parachute variable, and the error term in this 
case incorporates the credit rating information without the influence or impact of golden 
parachutes. In this first stage, we find that golden parachutes are negatively and significantly 
related to credit ratings.  The error term from this regression is labeled Credit  Rating and 
represents our primary measure of ratings in the multivariate analysis (for a similar analysis, 
see Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005; or Qi, Roth, and Wald, 2010).12  
We control for term structure effects using debt duration and convexity, and for liquidity 
effects using debt age. For an individual security, duration (Debt Duration) is defined as the 
discounted time weighted cash flow of the security divided by its price, and this captures the 
first derivative of price with respect to yield.  Debt convexity is the rate of change (second 
derivative) in the price-yield relation and represents the non-linear portion of the term structure 
of interest rates.  To proxy for liquidity, we use the log of bond age (Debt Age), where the age of 
the bond is the length of time (in years) that a bond has been outstanding.  For firms with 
multiple bonds, we compute the weighted average durations, convexities, and ages using the 
                                                 
10 If only one rating is available from Moody’s or S&P is available, we use that one in our analysis. 
11 For more information on the conversion numbers for both Moody’s and S&P firm bond ratings used in this 
study, see Table 1 in Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003). 
12 For robustness, we use the raw credit rating variable in our specifications and find similar results.  We also 
allow for a non-linear relation between bond yield spreads and credit ratings by using a binary variable (HighYield) 
that takes a value of one when the debt is non-investment grade and find similar results. 12 
 
summation of the weighted durations, convexities, and debt ages of all bonds for each firm, 
with the weight being the amount outstanding for each debt issue divided by total amount 
outstanding for all publicly traded debt for the firm.  
We also control for various governance structures that are known to impact takeovers and 
the cost of debt. These include institutional holdings  and  state laws restricting payouts.  
Institutional ownership is the ratio of shares owned by institutions divided by the total number 
of shares outstanding.  Our variable for state laws restricting payouts is the total asset constraint 
(TA Constraint), equal to the minimum asset to debt ratio for a payout to be made.  The prior 
literature shows that these laws affect capital structure (Wald and Long, 2007) and the cost of 
debt (Mansi, Maxwell, and Wald, 2009).  In states like New York and Texas, this variable equals 
1, in California this variable equals 1.25, and in Delaware this variable equals zero. 
We also utilize CEO age, measured as the age of the CEO at the year of observation.  We 
follow Jenter and Lewellen (2010) who find that retirement preferences of target CEOs have 
first-order effects on both bidder and target behavior, and use a dummy variable for the age of 
CEO in excess of 65 years (CEO Age > 65) as an additional control variable.  We measure CEO 
tenure as the number of years a CEO has been in office.  We also consider two additional 
variables: (i) a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO left the firm (CEO Leaves Firm), and 
(ii) a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO left office (CEO Leaves Office).  Finally, given 
that our variables are sensitive to time periods and industry effects, we control for both effects 
using two-digits SIC codes and year dummies. Table 1 provides a complete description of the 
variables used in the analysis.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.5. Descriptive Statistics 
We begin the analysis by considering how the incidence of golden parachutes changes over 
time.  Panel A of Table 2 reports the incidence of golden parachutes from 1990 to 2006 using the 
RiskMetrics database.  Panel A shows that during the period from 1990 to 2006, the percentage 
of  firms with golden parachutes  increased  monotonically  from  about  50% to 78%. The 
RiskMetrics database also provides information on severance agreements, but the use of these 13 
 
agreements have declined steadily  over time and in 2006 the variable stood at 3.5% of the 
sample. Since most golden parachutes include severance-like language, considering separate 
severance contracts is less meaningful.    
 [Insert Panel A of Table 2 about here] 
Panel B of Table 2 reports summary statistics for the sample segmented based on whether a 
firm has adopted a golden parachute or not.  We include the mean, median, and standard 
deviation for the segmented samples.  Firms with golden parachute contracts have higher yield 
spreads (mean and median values 297, and 183 basis points, respectively) than those without 
golden parachutes (mean and median values of 258 and 152 basis points, respectively). The 
mean differences between the two groups are statistically significant at the 1% level.  Since the 
mean and median values deviate largely from one another, the yield spread variable is highly 
skewed.  Therefore, we use the log of the yield rather than the level yield spread value in our 
multivariate analysis.13   
[Insert Panel B of Table 2 about here] 
For the golden parachute sample,  the variable total assets has a mean of $3.9  billion,  a 
median of $1.3 billion, and a standard deviation of $7.6 billion, respectively.  The mean and 
median leverage (short term plus long term debt) ratios is 46% with a standard deviation of 
19%, which indicates that a large portion of the sample consist of firms that have significant 
liabilities in their capital structure.  The firms are profitable with mean and median profitability 
ratios of 13%.  Firms on average, have a market-to-book ratio of 1.68, and equity volatility of 
43%. Institutions, on average, owned 65% of the shares outstanding with a standard deviation 
of 23%. Firms have mean and median governance indices of about 10 provisions and a median 
entrenchment index of about 3 provisions.  CEOs, on average, own 1.7% of the firm’s shares, 
have tenure of 7 years, have left their positions in 10% of the data, and are 56 years of age. The 
remaining variables are security specific.  The median bond rating variables for the full sample 
roughly equate to an S&P rating of BBB, which indicates that the sample has a mean rating just 
                                                 
13  Rerunning our specifications without taking the log of the yield spread  does not materially  change the 
statistical or economic significance of the results.   14 
 
above non-investment grade debt.  Bond ratings are lower for the sample with golden 
parachutes than for the sample without golden parachutes and the difference between the two 
samples is statistically significant.  The mean traded debt has duration of 5.8 years and has been 
outstanding for 3.6 years.   
Panel  C  of Table 2 describes the industry distribution of the sample using the Security 
Industry Classification (SIC) codes. Although we use two digit SIC codes to control for industry 
effects in our empirical analysis, for brevity we only report one digit SIC codes in  our 
descriptive analysis.  Based on our segmentation of golden parachutes, it seems that there are 
no major differences in the concentration of industries between the two samples. Most of the 
firms in the overall sample are in manufacturing (52%), transportation and communications 
(15%), services (14%), and whole trade sectors (13%).  The smallest concentrations of firms occur 
in the agriculture and forestry and public administration sectors.  
[Insert Panel C of Table 2 about here] 
 
4. Golden Parachutes and Bond Yield Spreads 
4.1. Primary Specifications 
We examine the relation between the presence of golden parachutes and bond yield spreads 
while controlling for other factors that are known to influence yield spreads.  We perform 
multivariate regressions using a variety of pooled cross-section and time-series as well as firm 
fixed effects.  We use clustered standard errors at the firm level as in Petersen (2009) to compute 
the t-statistics.  Our primary regression model is  
Ln(Spreadi,t)= B0 +B1 (GoldenParachutei,t) +B2 (EIndex - GP i,t) +B3-8 (FirmSpecifici,t) 
+B9-12 (Security Specific i,t) + B13 (TA Constrainti,t)   
 B14-30 (Time_Dumi,t) +  B31-118(Industry_Dumi,t) + εi,t                                       (1) 15 
 
Our principal concern in the analysis is the golden parachute coefficient estimate, B1.  A 
significant positive coefficient would provide support for the hypothesis that the use of golden 
parachutes is value decreasing to bondholders.   
Panel A of Table 3 summarizes the results of our regressions of the effect  of golden 
parachutes on the cost of debt financing.  Model 1 provides our baseline specification.  Model 2 
considers whether the golden parachute provision was recently adopted or was previously in 
existence.  Model 3 is similar to Model 1 but includes the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
governance index instead of the entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009).  
Model 4 reports the primary specification with firm fixed effects similar  to that in Coles, 
Lemmon, and Meschke (2003).  Model 5 utilizes an unfilled sample as in Bebchuk et al. (2010), 
where we do not replace years without governance data by the governance data in the last 
available year.    
[Insert Panel A of Table 3 about here] 
Across all specifications, we find a positive and significant relation (at the 1%level) between 
golden parachutes and the cost of debt financing, indicating that bondholders view golden 
parachutes as a device that does not protect their interests.  The coefficients across models vary 
from 0.119 for the unfilled sample to 0.157 for the fixed effects specification.  This translates to 
an increase in bond yield spread of about 12% to 16%, on average, across models.  As an 
average firm in our sample has a spread of 283 basis points, these estimates imply an increase of 
33 to 44 basis points in spread with the adoption of a golden parachute.  Note that Model 2 
shows that the coefficients on the Add and Keep golden parachutes are positively related to the 
cost of debt, with a magnitude of 9% for the add golden parachute and 12% for the keep golden 
parachute. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on these two variables 
are equal.  Overall, the results indicate that golden parachutes are not beneficial to bondholders, 
and that this is reflected in lower pricing of corporate debt.  Moreover, reverse causality is not a 
concern in this analysis as bond spreads do not affect the use golden parachutes.14  
                                                 
14 We test this assertion directly by examining a probit model where the dependent variable is whether the firm 
adds a golden parachute in a given year and the independent variables are lagged firm ratings, yield spreads, and 
other firm characteristics.  In this analysis, lagged ratings and spreads are not a significant determinant of whether 
the firm adds a golden parachute. 16 
 
The control variables across all models have their expected  signs, and in general, are 
statistically significant.  We find that firm size, sales growth, profitability, growth opportunities, 
and total asset constraint are negatively associated with yield spreads, while firm leverage and 
volatility are positively related to bond yield spreads.  Our debt specific variables (credit 
ratings, debt age, and debt convexity) are all positively related to spreads. Similar to the results 
of Bohjraj and Sengupta (2005), we find that institutional ownership is negatively related to 
yield spreads, and this evidence is consistent with monitoring.  
 
4.2. Robustness Testing 
We also provide additional robustness tests in Panel B of Table 3.  We are mainly concerned 
with whether golden parachutes are associated with bond spreads purely because of the 
increase in takeover probability, or whether golden parachutes impact bond spreads because of 
changes in risk and CEO effort.  If the effect of golden parachutes is purely due to takeovers, we 
would expect to see a more negative effect on bondholders of high-grade debt, whereas the 
effect on low-grade or junk debt might be positive or insignificant (Billet, King, and Mauer, 
2004, show the differential impacts of takeovers on differently rated bonds).  Models 1 and 2 
therefore segment the sample into investment and non-investment grade debt.  Similar to our 
baseline specification, we find a positive and significant association between the adoption of 
golden parachutes and the cost of debt financing for both segments, although the magnitude is 
smaller for the investment sample at about 6% versus 13% for the non-investment sample.  
 [Insert Panel B of Table 3 about here] 
Next, we directly control for the probability of takeover using the estimated probability of a 
takeover attempt as an additional control variable. We measure takeover attempts using a 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm receives an initial bid (Attempt).  For our analysis on 
takeover attempts, we obtain mergers and acquisitions data for the years 1988 to 2008 from the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC Platinum).  We extend the mergers and acquisitions data two 
years beyond our original sample period to ensure that initial bids are precisely defined. We 
include all acquisition deals coded as “mergers, acquisitions, and acquisitions of majority 
interest” and exclude spinoff acquisitions.  Following Bates and Lemmon (2003), we define a bid 17 
 
as an initial bid if there are no other bids for 365 days before the announcement date. The final 
sample contains 10,224 initial bids from the years 1990 to 2006. This dataset is merged with our 
annual data from RiskMetrics resulting in 1,217 initial bids. We include firm characteristics as 
independent variables in the first-stage procedure, and also include whether the firm has a 
golden parachute. Similar to Machlin et al. (1993) and Bebchuk et al. (2010) having a golden 
parachute significantly increases the probability of the firm receiving a bid.15  
Model 3 adds these additional estimated probabilities.16 As in our other specifications, the 
estimated coefficient on golden parachute continues  to be positive and significant after 
controlling for the predicted probability of takeovers, although the estimated coefficient is 
slightly lower.  A higher probability of a takeover bid also implies a slightly lower yield spread, 
although this result is not statistically (or economically) significant.  Overall, the results show 
that the use of golden parachutes is associated with higher yield spreads, and that this relation 
cannot be explained purely by an increase in takeover risk. 
Models 4 and 5 consider two main governance mechanisms: board structure and CEO 
compensation, both of which have been shown to affect the cost of capital (see e.g., Anderson, 
Mansi, and Reeb, 2004). We control for board of directors because boards are responsible for 
assigning golden parachutes to senior executives.  We proxy for board structure using Board 
Size equal to the log of the number of directors on the board, and board independence (Outside 
Ratio) equal to the ratio of independent directors to total directors. We control for the structure 
of CEO equity-based incentives using pay for performance sensitivity (PPS) and the volatility of 
the PPS (Vega) as in Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2012), both of which affect effort and risk taking 
incentives. PPS is computed as the log of the change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock 
price, and Vega is measured as the log of the dollar change in compensation that is caused by a 
1%  point  change in stock volatility.  In both models, we continue to find a positive and 
significant relation between the use of golden parachutes and the cost of debt financing.  The 
results also confirm the findings of a negative relation between board size and the cost of debt 
(Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2004), and the negative relation between PPS and Vega and the 
cost of capital.  
                                                 
15 We also examined the relation using completed acquisitions and find similar results. 
16 As these probabilities are estimated from a prior regression, we are careful to correct the estimated standard 
errors for this two-stage procedure.  Specifically, we bootstrap the standard errors while clustering by firm, where 
each bootstrap iteration estimates both the first and second stage regressions. 18 
 
 
4.3. Using the 2004 IRS Rule Change as a Natural Experiment  
4.3.1. Description of the Natural Experiment  
In this section, we examine whether the relation between the presence of golden parachutes 
and bond yield spreads  is  robust to the  use  of  a difference-in-difference  (DiD)  estimation 
method.  We consider the imposition of the IRS’s revenue rule 2004-87 (Sections 280G and 4999), 
which was designed to limit the increase in executive compensation associated with golden 
parachutes, as a natural experiment.    Section 280G prohibits  corporations  from  deducting 
golden parachute payments, and Section 4999 imposes  an additional 20% excise tax on the 
excess parachute payment for the executive.  In response to these rule changes, firms decreased 
the size of their severance package to avoid the additional tax, and also to avoid the appearance 
of making “excess” payments.  Thus, while the rule impacts change in control payouts only, the 
effect appears to have applied to other parts of CEOs’ severance agreements.  We use these 
changes in IRS regulations to identify an exogenous change in the value of golden parachutes to 
the CEO that does not otherwise affect the cost of debt. 
For the tax rule to be a valid test in our study, the event must be exogenous.  As this change 
in tax rules was not lobbied for by firms, it can safely  be considered an exogenous event.    
While this tax rule was finalized in 2004, the imposition of such a rule was discussed as early as 
1989.  If the rule was well anticipated before 2004, the DiD setup may be imprecisely timed, and 
we may not capture correctly the changes in the outcome because changes in behavior may 
have occurred prior to the actual rule change.    In this case, a draft version of the golden 
parachute tax proposal rule was considered in 2002.  Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) 
and Roberts and Whited (2011) suggest several ways to address potential concerns about the 
timing of the onset of a shock. They suggest repeating the DiD analysis on pre-event years and 
falsely assuming that the onset of treatment occurs one, two, or three years before it actually 
does. If the natural experiment is correctly timed, the DiD estimators of these falsification tests 
should not be statistically different from zero.   
 
4.3.2 Data and Sample 19 
 
On August 1, 2003, the Treasury Department released final regulations interpreting the 
golden parachute tax rules - sections 280G and 4999 of the Internal Revenue Code. This final 
regulation is effective for any payment contingent on a change in ownership or control if the 
change occurs on or after January 1, 2004.  The IRS previously proposed regulations under 
Section 280G in 1989; however, these were never finalized. We use January 1, 2004 as the date 
on which golden parachutes are affected by the change in IRS tax rules.   
Our treatment group is the firms with golden parachutes that would be subject to the new 
tax rules, and our control group is the firms without golden parachutes.  The DiD approach is 
beneficial because it combines two effects. The cross-sectional comparison avoids the problem 
of omitted trends by comparing two groups over the same time period, and the time series 
comparison avoids the problem of unobserved differences between the two groups by looking 
at the same firms before and after the change.  In our DiD estimation, we compare the treatment 
firms before and after the shock to the control firms before and after the shock. After controlling 
for other variables, this  approach  confirms our results that changes in the cost of debt are 
caused by changes in the incentive effects of golden parachutes.  
 
4.3.3 Results 
Panel A of Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the sample with golden parachutes 
(treatment) and the sample without golden parachute (control) before the enactment of the 2004 
IRS tax rule for the three years 2001 to 2003.  Included are the means, medians, and standard 
deviations of the treatment and control group as well as the differences in means tests (reported 
in p-values).  We find that firms with golden parachutes have higher mean and median bond 
yield spreads, smaller total assets, higher leverage, lower profitability, and higher volatility than 
firms without golden parachutes. The mean differences are statistically significant for all the 
variables with the exception of idiosyncratic risk.  
[Insert Panel A of Table 4 about here] 
Next, we examine the results using a DiD estimation.  Panel B of Table 4 reports the results 
for our specification in the two years around the tax rule change (2003 to 2004) and in the six 
years around the rule change (2001 to 2006).  Models 1 and 3 take into consideration year and 20 
 
industry effects.  Models 2 and 4 control for firm fixed effects.  In all specifications, we find that 
the interaction term between golden parachute and Tax Rule is negative, even after we control 
for firm fixed effects. For the average golden parachute firm in the sample, the yield spread 
decreases  by  10%  to 16%.    Models  5  and  6  follow Bertrand and  Mullainathan (2003)  and 
examine the effects of the exogenous event in every single year after the imposition of the tax 
rule. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term between golden parachute and the year 
2003 is economically and statistically insignificant. However, the interactions between golden 
parachutes and the years 2004, 2005, and 2006 are negative and significant.  In general, the 
results support the hypothesis that the effect of the tax rule is insignificant before 2004 and 
effective afterwards.17   
[Insert Panel B of Table 4 about here] 
As a falsification test, we check our results under the assumption that the onset of the event 
occurred before 2004.  That is, we test the results assuming that the event occurred in 2001, 2002, 
and 2003.  Panel C of Table 4 reports the results for three periods 2002-2003, 2001-2002, and 
2000-01.  Models 1, 3, and 5 are the baseline  specifications. Models 2, 4,  and 6 are  similar 
specifications but with firm fixed effects. In all regressions, we find an insignificant relation 
between the interaction term (golden parachute  and tax rule) and the cost of debt, which 
supports our argument that the imposition of the actual tax rule in 2004 affected the cost of debt 
financing.  
[Insert Panel C of Table 4 about here] 
In an unreported analysis, we construct a balanced sample where both the golden parachute 
and non-golden parachute firms have similar characteristics.  That is, we consider only firms 
without missing data and we truncate the sample so that both groups have similar costs of debt, 
total assets, leverage, market-to-book, profitability, and idiosyncratic risk.  We again apply the 
DiD regression analysis to this smaller sample and find results similar to those in the original 
                                                 
17 We also consider the sum of the coefficients on golden parachutes and the interaction of golden parachutes 
with the Tax Rule.  This sum is positive and significant in Model 1 and positive and not significant in Models 3 and 5.  
Estimating the baseline regression for just the years after the Tax Rule change, we find a positive and significant 
coefficient with roughly half the magnitude of the coefficient estimated over the entire period. Thus golden 
parachutes still have a negative effect on bondholders after 2004, but the magnitude of this effect is diminished. 21 
 
sample.  This further alleviates concerns about other sample characteristics driving our results.  
For the sample used in our DiD tests, neither volatility, profitability, nor CEO turnover  is 
significantly affected by the 2004 tax rule change.   This  finding  is expected given that the 
changes in these variables are not easily detectable in the shorter time period. 
 
5. Golden Parachutes and CEO Incentives 
5.1. Golden Parachute and Firm Risk  
Table 5 presents our segmented regression results from examining idiosyncratic risk and 
total risk as a function of whether the firm has added a golden parachute.  We include the 
entrenchment index without golden parachutes, market-to-book, firm size, and leverage as firm 
specific control variables. To control for autocorrelation and mitigate any potential causality 
problem, we follow Brick et al. (2012) and include lagged volatility as an additional control 
variable in all the regressions. That is, even if past volatility leads to an increase in the use of 
golden parachutes, the marginal effects  we capture are  the increases  in volatility due to a 
change in the addition of a golden parachute.18 Models 1 and 5 summarize the results of the 
idiosyncratic  and total risk regression including the Add Golden  Parachute  variable, 
respectively. We hypothesize that a CEO has an incentive to increase firm risk if the firm adds a 
golden parachute.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In both models, we find a positive and significant relation between the adoption of a golden 
parachute and firm risk. The coefficients on Add Golden Parachute in both models are positive 
and significant at the 1% level.  The regressions imply that on average a firm which adopts a 
golden parachute increases the annualized idiosyncratic and total risk of its stock return by 
about 9% under both specifications. The set of other entrenchment antitakeover provisions also 
has a significant impact on firm risk, though, in the opposite direction. In particular, if a firm 
adopts one more entrenchment antitakeover provision, aside from golden parachute, the 
annualized idiosyncratic and total risk of its stock returns decreases by 3%.   
                                                 
18 The results are not sensitive to the number of lags used in this specification. 22 
 
One alternative reason that golden parachutes may imply greater stock volatility is that they 
lead to more takeovers, not because they lead to more risk taking by the manager.  We therefore 
explicitly consider the subsample of firm-year observations where there is no takeover attempt.  
Models 2 and 6 report the results for the subsample where no takeover attempts took place, and 
the  results are unchanged for our coefficients of interest.    The coefficients on Add Golden 
Parachute in both models are positive and significant at the 1% level, and on average, suggest 
that firms that adopt golden parachutes increase annualized idiosyncratic and total stock return 
risk by about 9%.  This result is similar to the baseline specification, and suggests that the 
increase in risk is not just due to greater takeover risk. 
Another alternative hypothesis is that CEOs have an incentive to reduce effort if a golden 
parachute is in place, and this leads to greater turnover.  As Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg 
(2005) show that CEO turnover implies greater stock return variability, the increase we find in 
stock volatility could therefore be due to changes in CEO turnover.  We therefore repeat our 
analyses in Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 excluding any firm-years in which the CEO left the firm.  The 
results are similar across the models with the addition of a golden parachute  implying an 
increase in firm risk in the range of 10% to 11%, thus the increase in risk is not just due to 
greater turnover.    Overall, the results suggest that the adoption of golden parachute is 
associated with an increase in firm idiosyncratic as well as total risk.  
 
5.2. Golden Parachutes and Operating Performance 
Research by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick  (2003) and Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) 
suggests  that weak governance gives rise to agency costs which in turn lower operating 
performance.  Consistent with this hypothesis, these authors document that weak governance is 
associated  with lower operating performance.  We  extend their analysis by examining  the 
relation between the adoption of golden parachutes  (as  a  measure of poor incentives)  and 
operating performance (as a proxy for CEO effort).  In other words, we measure whether firms 
in which CEOs have golden parachutes have weaker cash flows than firms whose CEOs do not.  
We follow Core et al. and regress three measures of futures operating performance on golden 
parachutes using the Newey-West procedure with one lag to adjust for serial correlation. That is  23 
 
Performancei,t = B0 +B1 (GoldenParachutei,t-1) +B2 (Log MVEi,t-1)  
              +B3  (log MBEi,t-1)  +B4  (EIndex  –  GP)i,t-1  +  εi,t                                       
  (2) 
where performance is one of three measures: (i)  industry adjusted ROA before depreciation 
(ROA1),  (ii)  industry adjusted ROA  after depreciation  (ROA2),  and  (iii)  industry adjusted 
annual sales growth (Ind. Adj. Sales Growth). The independent variables (all lagged one period) 
include GoldenParachute, a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a golden parachute 
in the current period, (EIndex – GP) is the entrenchment index less golden parachute, logMVE 
is the log of market value of equity, and logBME is the log of book to market value of equity. A 
negative value on β1 indicates that the presence of a golden parachute is associated with lower 
operating performance. 
We utilize the methodology in Fama and McBeth (1973) and Core et al. (2006) and estimate 
the regressions by year and report mean and standard deviation of the time series as well as t-
statistics of the overall regressions. The results for our three measure of operating performance 
are provided in Table 6.  In all three models we find a negative and significant relation (at the 
1% level) between the use of golden parachutes and firm performance.  The evidence shows 
that  the  use  of golden parachutes  in the current period is associated with lower operating 
performance in the subsequent period, and this is consistent with golden parachutes implying 
decreased CEO effort. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5.3. Golden Parachutes and CEO Turnover 
We next consider whether golden parachutes impact the frequency of CEO turnover.  Table 
7 summarizes the results of probit regressions where CEO turnover is the dependent variable.  
Model 1 is our baseline specification and includes the effect of golden parachutes when a CEO 
leaves the firm.  Model 2 is similar to Model 1 but only consider a subsample with no takeover 
attempts.  Model 3 provides results where the dependent variable is whether the CEO leaves 24 
 
office rather than leaving the firm.  Model 4 is similar to Model 2 but again only considers the 
subsample with no takeover attempts.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
The results in Model 1 confirm the effect of a golden parachute in the previous year on the 
likelihood of CEO turnover in the current year.  In particular, if a golden parachute is in effect in 
the prior year, the likelihood that the CEO leaves the firm this year will increase by 
approximately 11%.  In Model 2, the coefficient of a golden parachute is generally the same in 
both its magnitude and significance level.  The results from Models 3 through 4 are also similar; 
if a golden parachute is adopted last year, the likelihood of a CEO leaving their position this 
year will increase by about 8%, and this finding is significant at the 5% or 10% level depending 
on the specification. Overall, across all models the results indicate a higher likelihood of CEO 
departure if a golden parachute is in place.   
 
6. Conclusion 
Recently, under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, a great deal of attention has been given to 
provisions in compensation contracts known as golden parachutes.   Golden parachutes are 
severance payments assigned to senior executives upon a triggering event such as termination, 
demotion, or resignation  contingent on a change of control.  In this paper, we examine  the 
relation between the use of golden parachutes and the cost of debt and also show how golden 
parachutes affect CEO incentives with respect to risk and effort.  
Using a sample of publicly traded debt covering the period from 1990 through 2006, we find 
that the adoption of a golden parachute in compensation contracts is associated with an increase 
in the cost of debt capital, and again this is consistent with greater risk taking and a decrease in 
CEO effort.  Specifically, we find that firms whose CEOs have golden parachutes have yield 
spreads that are about 12% higher, on average, than similar firms without golden parachutes. 
This result is robust to controlling for a variety of variable including credit rating, likelihood of 
a takeover attempt, institutional ownership, state laws, golden parachute adoption (new vs. 
old), and firm-specific fixed effects.  To address potential causality issues, we consider a natural 
experiment based on a 2004 IRS tax ruling.  This natural experiment confirms our findings that 25 
 
golden parachutes cause higher bond yield spreads. Examining other incentive effects of golden 
parachutes, we find that golden parachutes are associated with higher volatility, lower 
performance, and greater CEO turnover.  Overall, the results suggest that golden parachutes is 
associated with a number of negative incentives for CEOs, and that bondholders are sensitive to 
governance mechanisms which change managerial incentives.  26 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Description  Database 
     
Yield Spread 
Difference between the yield to maturity on a corporate bond and the yield to maturity on its duration 
equivalent Treasury security  LBFI 
Golden Parachute  Dummy variable that equals one if a CEO has a golden parachute  RiskMetrics 
Firm Size  Log of book value of assets (in $millions)  Compustat 
Leverage  Long-term debt scaled by book value assets  Compustat 
Profitability   Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization scaled by total assets  Compustat 
Market-to-Book  The market value of assets scaled by the book value of assets  Compustat 
Sales Growth  Annual sales growth in the firm’s total revenue  Compustat 
Idiosyncratic Risk  Natural logarithm of the annualized variance of the residuals from the market model   CRSP 
Total Risk  Natural logarithm of the annualized variance of daily returns  CRSP 
Volatility   Standard deviation of f the residuals from the market model of daily returns, annualized  CRSP 
Abnormal Stock Return  The rolling mean monthly abnormal stock return over 12 month  CRSP 
Rating  Average of Moody’s and S&P ratings, computed using a scale between 22 and 1   LBFI 
Credit Rating  Orthogonalized credit rating variable  LBFI 
Bond Age  Log of number of years since bond issuance  LBFI 
Duration  Macaulay duration or security’s effective maturity  LBFI 
Convexity  Second derivative of price with respect to yield  LBFI 
EIndex   Entrenchment index of antitakeover rights  RiskMetrics 
EIndex – GP  Entrenchment index less golden parachutes  RiskMetrics 
GIndex  Gompers et al. (2003) index of antitakeover rights  RiskMetrics 
GIndex – GP  Gompers et al. (2003) index of antitakeover rights less golden parachutes  RiskMetrics 
Add Golden Parachute  Dummy variable that equals one if GP is adopted in current year but not in prior year  RiskMetrics 
Keep Golden Parachute  Dummy variable that equals one if GP is adopted in current and prior years  RiskMetrics 
Severance  Dummy variable that equals one if a company has a severance plan for its executives   RiskMetrics 
CEO Age  CEO age while CEOs stays in the office   Execucomp 
CEO Tenure  Number of years a CEO stays in the office  Execucomp 
CEO Leaves Firms  Dummy variable that equals one if a CEO left the firm  Execucomp 
CEO Leaves Office  Dummy variable that equals one if a CEO left her office   Execucomp 
PPS  Pay-performance sensitivity, measured as the change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock price  Execucomp 
Vega  Dollar change in compensation that is caused by a 1% change in stock volatility  Execucomp 
Institutional Ownership  Number of shares held by institutions scaled by common shares outstanding  Thomson Fin. 
TA Constraint  The minimum asset to debt ratio required before a payout can be made  Lexus/Nexus 
     30 
 
Table 2. Sample Statistics 
 


















           
1990  1,114  552  N/A  N/A  49.55 
1993  1,183  618  79  46  52.24 
1995  1,228  656  67  34  53.42 
1998  1,560  850  114  33  54.49 
2000  1,479  937  181  23  63.35 
2002  1,600  1072  146  12  67.00 
2004  1,574  1148  115  24  72.94 
2006  1,488  1158  89  12  77.82 
             
Note: This panel provides information regarding the incidence of 11,226 (or 22,931 based on the filled sample) golden 
parachutes over the period from 1990 through 2006. The table presents the frequency, percentage of golden parachute 
adoptions, and number of firms with golden parachutes. N/A denotes not available. The data are presented in a 
volume-by-volume basis (i.e., without filled years). 
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Panel B. Descriptive statistics 
 
   
Golden Parachute 




Variable  Mean  Median 
Standard 




(4) – (7) 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Yield Spread  296.96  183.45  465.29  258.15  152.23  409.19  6.75c 
Rating  BBB-  BBB  A/B+  BBB  BBB+  A+/BB-  -10.14c 
Debt Age  3.595  3.030  2.943  3.743  3.111  3.144  -1.76c 
Debt Duration  5.814  5.615  2.203  6.016  5.819  2.351  -3.22c 
Debt Convexity  0.571  0.405  0.488  0.628  0.451  0.535  -4.08c 
 
             
Total Assets  3,920.31  1,255.97  7,614.32  4,568.77  1,016.78  9,602.14  -5.54c 
Leverage  0.463  0.456  0.187  0.429  0.422  0.201  12.58c 
Profitability  0.128  0.128  0.092  0.137  0.136  0.099  -7.22c 
Volatility  0.427  0.339  0.307  0.461  0.367  0.330  -7.72c 
Market-to-Book  1.678  1.357  1.014  1.895  1.441  1.282  -13.26c 
ROA1  0.048  0.029  0.111  0.055  0.035  0.113  -4.68c 
ROA2  0.045  0.026  0.111  0.052  0.033  0.114  -4.61c 
Sales Growth  -0.020  -0.015  0.194  -0.003  -0.004  0.189  -6.11c 
               
EIndex  2.719  3.000  1.059  1.145  1.000  1.064  110.08c 
GIndex  9.881  10.000  2.460  7.750  8.000  2.592  62.87c 
Inst. Ownership  0.646  0.673  0.230  0.543  0.554  0.230  29.99c 
CEO Ownership  0.017  0.002  0.221  0.039  0.004  0.079  -7.25c 
CEO Age  55.653  56.000  7.048  56.124  56.000  8.395  -3.75c 
CEO Tenure  6.660  5.000  6.142  8.613  6.000  8.371  -16.72c 
CEO Leaves Position  0.101  0.000  0.301  0.080  0.000  0.272  4.31c 
CEO Leaves Firm    0.054  0.000  0.226  0.036  0.000  0.187  5.05c 
 
Note:  This panel provides summary statistics sorted by firms with golden parachutes. The overall  dataset is 
comprised of 22,931 firm-year observations on 2,730 firms for the years from 1990 to 2006. Variable definitions are 
provided is in Table 1. The notations a,b,c denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 32 
 




  Golden  
Parachute 
    Non-Golden 
Parachute 
Code  Industry Classifications  Obs.  (%)  Obs.  (%) 
           
0  Agriculture and Forestry  31  0.23  30  0.33 
1  Mining and Construction  812  5.90  407  4.44 
2  Manufacturing (Food-Petroleum)  2,786  20.25  2,045  22.30 
3  Manufacturing (Plastics-Electronics)  4,221  30.68  2,766  30.16 
4  Transportation and Communication  2,231  16.21  1,316  14.35 
5  Wholesale Trade   1,693  12.30  1,206  13.15 
7  Services (Hotels-Recreation)  1,464  10.64  1,080  11.78 
8  Services (Health-Private Household)  463  3.36  245  2.67 
9  Public Administration and Other  59  0.43  76  0.83 
           
  Total Observations  13,760  100  9,171  100 
             
Note: This panel provides industry classification for the sample based on 1-digit SIC code. The data comprised of 
22,931 firm year observations on 2,730 non-financial firms covering the period from 1990 through 2006.  
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Table 3. Golden Parachutes and the Cost of Debt 
 









Fixed         
Effects 
Unfilled   
Sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Golden Parachute   0.119c    0.121c  0.157c  0.127c 
  (5.75)    (5.88)  (4.62)  (5.00) 
Add Golden Parachute    0.090b       
    (2.40)       
Keep Golden Parachute    0.122c       
    (5.66)       
GIndex – EIndex      -0.010a     
      (-1.88)     
EIndex – GP  0.019b  0.017a  0.024c  0.058b  0.022b 
  (2.21)  (1.88)  (2.71)  (2.51)  (2.29) 
Firm Size  -0.048c  -0.049c  -0.047c  -0.074b  -0.036c 
  (-4.32)  (-4.41)  (-4.17)  (-2.05)  (-2.63) 
Leverage  0.375c  0.352c  0.379c  0.488c  0.371c 
  (5.38)  (4.80)  (5.46)  (4.74)  (4.31) 
Profitability  -1.175c  -1.086c  -1.167c  -1.273c  -1.169c 
  (-6.21)  (-5.23)  (-6.21)  (-5.31)  (-5.46) 
Sales Growth  -0.157c  -0.169c  -0.162c  -0.129c  -0.195c 
  (-4.13)  (-4.32)  (-4.23)  (-3.27)  (-3.83) 
Volatility  0.263c  0.241c  0.260c  0.242c  0.349c 
  (5.99)  (5.54)  (5.96)  (6.90)  (6.39) 
Credit Rating  -0.132c  -0.133c  -0.131c  -0.124c  -0.140c 
  (-27.39)  (-26.86)  (-27.34)  (-12.16)  (-25.49) 
Market to Book  -0.039b  -0.039b  -0.041b  -0.076c  -0.042b 
  (-2.43)  (-2.37)  (-2.56)  (-3.28)  (-2.48) 
Debt Duration  0.022  0.025a  0.022   0.029  0.033  
  (1.54)  (1.74)  (1.53)  (1.64)  (1.64) 
Debt Convexity  0.020  0.014  0.020  -0.041  0.007 
  (0.32)  (0.22)  (0.33)  (-0.54)  (0.09) 
Debt Age  0.072c  0.077c  0.073c  0.083c  0.061c 
  (7.39)  (7.63)  (7.50)  (7.54)  (5.27) 
TA Constraint  -0.097c  -0.095c  -0.092c    -0.110c 
  (-4.66)  (-4.49)  (-4.35)    (-4.50) 
Institutional Ownership  -0.180c  -0.177c  -0.174c  -0.288c  -0.176c 
  (-3.36)  (-3.18)  (-3.20)  (-2.68)  (-2.59) 
           
R-Squared  0.770  0.766  0.771  0.558  0.763 
Observations  4,614  4,416  4,614  4,614  2,109 
 
Note: This table provides estimated coefficients from regressing the log of corporate yield spreads (or the difference 
between the weighted average yield on the firm’s outstanding debt and the yield on a treasure security with a similar 
duration) on the golden parachute and various control variables. The data covers the period from 1990 to 2006. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Year and 2-digit SIC code dummies are included in all regressions. T-
statistics from White heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are included in 
parentheses. The notations a,b,c denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B. Alternative specifications 
 










  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Golden Parachute  0.063c  0.132c  0.131c  0.108c  0.114c  
  (2.77)  (3.94)  (4.96)  (4.90)  (4.78) 
EIndex – GP  0.019a  0.033b  0.016  0.019b  0.018a 
  (1.94)  (2.34)  (1.61)  (2.00)  (1.79) 
Firm Size  -0.067c  -0.013  -0.052c  -0.043c  0.006 
  (-5.59)  (-0.72)  (-4.02)  (-3.21)  (0.38) 
Leverage  0.284c  0.490c  0.362c  0.337c  0.304c 
  (2.87)  (4.86)  (4.48)  (4.39)  (3.14) 
Profitability  -0.799c  -1.581c  -0.929c  -1.220c  -0.906c 
  (-3.22)  (-5.96)  (-4.35)  (-6.14)  (-4.03) 
Sales Growth  -0.168c  -0.075  -0.163c  -0.188c  -0.179c 
  (-3.85)  (-1.23)  (-4.12)  (-4.64)  (-3.72) 
Volatility  0.144c  0.241c  0.256c  0.250c  0.288c 
  (3.54)  (3.09)  (5.32)  (5.31)  (7.04) 
Credit Rating  -0.090c  -0.111c  -0.133c  -0.133c  -0.138c 
  (-14.54)  (-8.99)  (-25.72)  (-26.55)  (-24.67) 
Market to Book  -0.054c  -0.087b  -0.048c  -0.035b  -0.008 
  (-3.39)  (-2.34)  (-2.70)  (-2.11)  (-0.42) 
Debt Duration  0.068c  -0.079b  0.030b  0.050c  0.047b 
  (4.47)  (-2.40)  (1.99)  (3.37)  (2.46) 
Debt Convexity  -0.133b  0.216  -0.007  -0.073  -0.075 
  (-2.10)  (1.23)  (-0.12)  (-1.10)  (-0.87) 
Debt Age  0.103c  -0.010  0.080c  0.065c  0.070c 
  (9.53)  (-0.55)  (7.72)  (5.91)  (5.60) 
TA Constraint  -0.048b  -0.109c  -0.105c  -0.100c  -0.060b 
  (-2.06)  (-3.38)  (-4.10)  (-4.42)  (-2.35) 
Institutional Ownership  -0.007  -0.228c  -0.176c  -0.222c  -0.049 
  (-0.11)  (-2.95)  (-2.96)  (-3.45)  (-0.70) 
Predicted Takeover      -0.672     
      (-0.98)     
Board Size        -0.008a   
        (-1.82)   
Outside Ratio        0.018   
        (0.32)   
PPS          -0.044c 
          (-3.49) 
Vega          -0.032b 
          (-2.26) 
           
R-Squared  0.639  0.641  0.760  0.775  0.769 
Observations  2,965  1,649  4,197  3,469  2,721 
 
Note: This table provides estimated coefficients from regressing the log of corporate yield spreads (or the difference 
between the weighted average yield on the firm’s outstanding debt and the yield on a treasure security with a similar 
duration) on the golden parachute and various control variables.  The data covers the period from 1990 to 2006. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Year and 2-digit SIC code dummies are included in all regressions.  T-
statistics from White heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are included in 
parentheses. The notations a,b,c denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 35 
 
Table 4. Golden Parachutes and the Cost of Debt - Difference in Difference Estimation 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (before tax regulation) 
 
   
Golden Parachutes  
(n=512) 
   
Non-Golden Parachutes 
(n=126) 
   
 
Mean  Median 
Std. 







(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
   
           
Yield Spread  325.33  230.63  324.17  245.14  161.10  283.28  0.011c 
Total Asset  8,789.10  4,661.24  10,013.9  10,625.6  6,875.25  11,197.8  0.072a 
Leverage   0.528  0.513  0.133  0.453  0.442  0.146  0.000c 
Market-to-Book  1.477  1.254  0.748  1.855  1.513  1.046  0.000c 
Profitability  0.129  0.123  0.067  0.145  0.143  0.065  0.019b 
Volatility  0.375  0.295  0.277  0.394  0.292  0.357  0.509 
 
           
   
Note: This panel provides descriptive statistics for the treatment and control firms before the 2004 tax regulation. The 
date covers the period from 2001 to 2003. Variables are provided in Table 1.  Firms with golden parachutes are 
treatment firms and firms without golden parachutes are control firms. The notations a,b,c denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B: Regression specifications 
 
  2003-04  2003-04  2001-06  2001-06  2001-06  2001-06 
                                   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Golden Parachute 
0.208c 
(3.61)   
0.192c 
(4.19)   
0.222c 
(4.15)   








(-2.52)     




















             
Firm Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Debt Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Industry Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Years Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clusters  353  353  283  283  283  283 
             
Observations           629  629  1,249  1,249  1,249  1,249 
R-Squared  0.79  0.446  0.802  0.625  0.802  0.625 
 
Note: This panel provides regression results using the difference-in-difference methodology. Tax rule is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the year is greater than 2003.  The variables Year 2003, Year 2004, Year 2005, and Year 2006 
are dummy variables that equal 1 if the Year is 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively. Variables definitions are 
provided in Table 1. The notations a,b,c denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel C: Falsification specifications 
 
  2002-03  2002-03  2001-02  2001-02  2000-01  2000-01 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
GP 
0.053 
(0.47)   
0.149b 
(2.13)   
0.144b 
(2.00)   













             
Firm Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Debt Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Industry Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Years Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clusters  290  290  295  295  266  266 
             
Observations                       532  532  534  534  478  478 
R-squared                         0.855  0.634  0.835  0.315  0.769  0.253 
 
Note: This panel provides regression results using the difference-in-difference methodology. Tax rule is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the year is greater than 2003.  Variables definitions are provided in Table 1. The notations a,b,c 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 38 
 
Table 5. Golden Parachutes and Firm Risk 
 
    Idiosyncratic Risk          Total Risk   





























& CEO Not 
Leaving 
Firm 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 








































       
























































                 
Observations  16,845  15,895  11,672  11,408  16,849  15,899  11,673  11,409 
R-Squared  0.517  0.516  0.504  0.503  0.539  0.538  0.529  0.528 
 
Note: This table provides OLS regressions on firm volatility. The dataset covers the period from 1990 to 2006. The dependent variable is natural logarithm of the 
annualized variance of the residuals from the market model (Idiosyncratic Risk) or the natural logarithm of the annualized variance of daily returns (Total Risk). 
Variable definitions are included in Table1.  Year and 2-digit SIC code dummies are included in all regressions. T-statistics from White heteroskedastic-consistent 
standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are included in parentheses. The notations a,b,c denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 39 
 
 





(ROA1)  Obs. 
ROA After 
Depreciation 
(ROA2)  Obs. 
Ind. Adj. 
Sales  
Growth  Obs. 
 
(1)    (2)    (3)   
  1991  -0.646  1,025  -0.473  1,029  -1.529a  1,027 
  1992  -0.421  1,008  -0.261  1,013  -1.355  1,012 
  1993  -0.234  959  -0.158  963  -0.851  962 
  1994  -0.593  1,041  -0.661  1,044  -0.221  1,043 
  1995  0.097  989  -0.105  991  -0.739  990 
  1996  -0.121  1,068  -0.514  1,069  -1.393  1,068 
  1997  -0.172  1,000  -0.296  1,006  -0.837  1,006 
  1998  -0.508  863  -0.542  869  -0.577  870 
  1999  -1.165a  1,224  -1.134a  1,227  -2.277a  1,227 
  2000  -0.613  1,094  -0.618  1,098  0.559  1,097 
  2001  -1.196  1,134  -1.000  1,139  -0.976  1,137 
  2002  -1.403b  1,080  -1.389a  1,083  -4.725c  1,081 
  2003  -0.093  1,385  0.013  1,388  -1.060  1,385 
  2004  0.446  1,266  0.559  1,266  1.105  1,265 
  2005  -0.708  1,345  -0.624  1,347  -0.98  1,346 
  2006  -0.106  1,174  0.209  1,175  0.073  1,173 
 
           
Mean  -0.465c    -0.437c    -0.986c   
Std. 
Deviation  0.137    0.131    0.309   
T-Statistics  (-3.39)    (-3.34)    (-3.19)   
 
Note. This table provides results from regressing the lagged  golden parachute variable on the median industry-
adjusted ROA and Sales Growth. ROA is the ratio of operating income scaled by total assets. We measure operating 
income in two ways: before and after depreciation (ROA1 and ROA2). Sales Growth is annual sale growth in the 
firm’s total revenue. Control variables include entrenchment index less golden parachutes, log of book-to-market 
equity, and log of market value of equity. All control variables are lagged one year.  We  use the Newey-West 
procedure with one lag to adjust for serial correlation and compute the time-series mean of coefficients and standard 
deviation and t-statistics for the average of the coefficients. The notations a,b,c denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. For ease of exposition, all coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
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Table 7. Golden Parachutes and CEO Turnover 
 
    CEO Leaves Firm  CEO Leaves Office   
  Primary 
Specification  Attempt=0 
Primary 
Specification  Attempt=0 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Golden Parachutet-1  0.112b  0.111b  0.077b  0.078b 
  (2.33)  (2.27)  (2.05)  (2.07) 
  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.011]  [0.011] 
(EIndex – GP)t-1  0.043b  0.050b  0.023  0.023 
  (2.16)  (2.43)  (1.46)  (1.45) 
Firm Sizet-1  0.001  0.000  0.039c  0.041c 
  (0.08)  (-0.06)  (3.02)  (3.22) 
Leveraget-1  0.278b  0.301b  0.149  0.147 
  (1.97)  (2.10)  (1.36)  (1.32) 
Market to Bookt-1  -0.053b  -0.045b  -0.014  -0.012 
  (-2.29)  (-1.97)  (-0.92)  (-0.78) 
Stock Returnt-1  -3.758c  -3.717c  -2.569c  -2.541c 
  (-5.86)  (-5.64)  (-4.77)  (-4.62) 
(CEO Age > 65)t  0.458c  0.483c  0.711c  0.733c 
  (6.70)  (6.97)  (13.65)  (13.88) 
Inst-Ownt-1  0.182  0.258a  0.167a  0.214b 
  (1.42)  (1.92)  (1.74)  (2.19) 
         
Pseudo R-Squared  0.057  0.061  0.057  0.060 
Observations  10,545  10,297  10,742  10,490 
 
Note: This table provides probit regressions on the likelihood of CEO turnover. The dataset covers the period from 
1990 to 2006. The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 is dummy variable that equals one if a CEO left the firm, and 
for Columns 4-6 if a CEO left the office.  Variable definitions are provided in Table1. Lagged rolling mean monthly 
abnormal stock return over the 12 months (Stock Returnst-1).. Year and 2-digit SIC code dummies are included in all 
regressions. T-statistics from White heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are 
included in parentheses. The marginal effects of golden parachutes on the probability of CEO turnover are provided 
in bold square brackets. The notations a,b,c denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 